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This paper analyzes the relationship between trade policy and economic performance. The
paper is divided in two fundamental parts. The first one uses a cross country data set to
investigate the relationship between trade policy and productivity growth. It is found that
countries that are more open to the rest of the world have experienced faster growth in total
factor productivity than countries with high trade barriers. In the second part the recent Latin
American experiences with trade liberalization reforms are investigated. It is shown that in the
last few years the Latin American countries have gone from having one of the most distorted
external sectors, to having very low degrees of protectionism. The extent of the liberalization
efforts is documented and the effect on productivity and exports is investigated.
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After decades of protectionist policies, most of Latin America began to open up
to the rest of the world in the late 1980s. This process, pioneered by Chile, is perhaps
the most impressive achievement of the structural adjustment programs of the last
decade. It has effectively put an end to more than four decades of generalized import
substitution policies aimed at encouraging an industrial sector, that turned Out to be
largely inefficient.'
The process leading to these trade reforms has not been easy. As recently as in
the mid-1980s the protectionist view was still dominant in many parts of Latin
America. In fact, the debt crisis of 1982 provided a new impetus to the protectionist
paradigm. Initially, many analysts interpreted the crisis as a failure of "the world
economic order", and argued that the only way for Latin America to avoid the
recurrence of this type of shocks was to further isolate itself from the rest of the
world, through selective protectionism and government intervention. This sentiment
was compounded by the fact that a number of observers considered the experiences of
the Southern Cone countries --Argentina,Chile and Uruguay --withliberalization
reforms during the 1970s as a failure. This view has been clearly synthesized by
Lance Taylor (1991, p. 119) who has argued that the "trade liberalization strategy is
intellectually moribund" and that there are "no great benefits (plus some costs) in
following open trade and capital market strategies" (p.141).From here he goes on to
say that "development strategies oriented internally may be a wise choice towards the
century's end" (p. 141).2
Immediately following the eruption of the debt crisis it seemed that increased
protectionism was indeed the path that Latin countries had chosen as a possible way
out of their problems. Even Chile, the strongest supporter of free trade, tripled its
import tariffs.2 As a result of this, in the mid-1980s Latin America had one of the
most distorted external sectors in the world with extremely high import tariffs and, in
some cases, quantitative restrictions that covered every single import item (see Table
1).
However, by 1987-88 it became increasingly apparent that a permanent solution
to the region's economic problems would require a fundamental change in its
development strategy. In particular, policymakers began to realize that the long-stand-
ing protectionist trade policy was central to the region's problems. The poor
performance of the Latin American countries offered a dramatic contrast to the rapidly
growing East-Asian countries that had aggressively implemented outward-oriented
strategies. With the help of the multilateral institutions, a larger and larger number of
countries began to reduce their levels of protection during the late 1980s and early
l990s. This trade reform process has been supplemented with broad deregulation and
privatization, and is proceeding at an increasingly rapid pace. Tariffs have been
drastically slashed, in many cases import licenses and prohibitions have been
completely eliminated, and a number of countries are actively trying to sign free trade
agreements with the United States.
Latin America's long tradition with protectionist policies molded the region's
economic structure in a fundamental way, creating a largely inefficient manufacturing3
sector.3 Tariffs and prohibitions also generated a severe anti-export bias that
discouraged both the growth and diversification of exports.4 This process took place
through two main channels: first, tariffs and other forms of protection increased the
cost of imported intermediate materials and capital goods used in the production of
exportable, reducing their effective rate of protection. Second, and perhaps more
important, the maze of protectionist policies resulted in massive real exchange rate
'overvaluation" that reduced the degree of competitiveness of exports.5 Paradoxically,
the policies which were supposed to reduce Latin America's dependency on the world-
wide business cycle, ended up creating a highly vulnerable economic structure where
the sources of foreign exchange were concentrated on a few products intensive in
natural resources (Fishlow, 1985).
The trade liberalization programs implemented during the last decade have two
basic policy objectives: first, these reforms have sought to reduce the anti-export bias
of commercial policies. It is expected that once negative effective rates of protection
and overvalued exchange rates are eliminated exports will not only grow rapidly, but
will also become more diversified.
The second fundamental objective of trade reforms is to transform international
trade into "the engine of growth'. The new literature on "endogenous" growth has
stressed the role of openness in explaining cross country growth differentials over the
long run.6 For example, Romer (1989) has argued that more open economies can take
advantage of larger markets, increasing their degree of efficiency and their rate of
growth. Other authors, including Grossman and Helpman (1990, 1991) and Edwards4
(1992), have recently argued that openness affects the speed and efficiency with which
small countries can absorb technological innovations developed in the industrial world.
This idea, based on an insight first proposed by John Stuart Mill, implies that countries
with a lower level of trade distortions will experience faster total factor productivity
growth and, thus, will grow faster than countries that inhibit international competition.7
The purpose of this paper is to explore, from different perspectives, the
relationship between trade liberalization and growth. The analysis deals both with long
run and with transitional issues. I first concentrate (in Section II) on the long run
relation between trade regimes and productivity growth. I use a broad 54countries
data set to investigate the way in which trade distortions have affected productivity
growth in the 1971-82 period. The results obtained support the view that more open
economies tend to have faster rates of productivity growth than countries that have
distorted international trade. In Sections mandIV, I discuss some of the most
important problems faced during the transition by countries engaged in trade
liberalization programs. While in Section ifi, I focus on general transitional issues at
an analytical level, in Section JV, I deal with the recent Latin American trade reforms.
I first document the extent of trade liberalization. Second, I investigate whether, as
predicted by some authors, these reforms have been associated with faster productivity
growth. In Section V, I discuss the recent behavior of real exchange rates in Latin
America, emphasizing the way in which they are likely to affect the sustainability of
the trade reforms. Finally, in Section VI, I present a summary of the paper and I
discuss some of the unresolved issues related to Latin American trade policy.5
II. Openness and Growth Cross Country Evidence
11.1 A Simple Model
A number of researchers have found that factor accumulation explains between
one half and two thirds of long run growth (Fischer, 1988). The large unexplained
residual in growth accounting exercises has been attributed to "technological progress"
or "productivity gains". From a policy perspective a key question is what determines
these productivity improvements. In particular, it is important to understand whether
national domestic policies --includingfinancial and trade policies --canaffect the pace
of productivity growth. If this is the case, policymakers will have additional degrees
of freedom to pursue those avenues that will enhance long run performance.
The recent interest on "endogenous" growth models has generated a revival in
applied research on the determinants of growth. Some authors have emphasized the
role of openness in determining the pace at which countries can absorb technological
progress originating in the rest of the world. Edwards (1992), for example, has
recently assumed that there are two sources of total factor productivity (TFP) growth:
(1) a purely domestic source stemming from local technological improvements
(innovation); and (2) a foreign source related to the absorption of inventions
generated in other nations (imitation). More specifically, assume that the country's
ability to appropriate world technical innovations (or to imitate) depends on two
factors: positively on the degree of openness of the economy, and also positively, on
the gap between the country's level of TFP and "the World's" stock of TFP. The first
channel is the "openness effect" discussed by Lewis (1955): more open countries have6
anadvantage in absorbing new ideas generated in the rest of the world. In this context
"more open" should be interpreted as referring to a less distorted foreign trade sector.
The second channel is a "catch up" effect, common to growth models based on
"convergence" notions.
If the aggregate production function is defined as y1 =Af(K,L.),then total
factor productivity is A =yjf('),and total productivity growth is (A/A). The role
of the two sources of technical progress discussed above --innovationand imitation —
canbe captured by the following simple expression:
(1)
whereand y are positive parameters, A* is the level of world's (appropriable)
TFP, and c, is the rate of growth of world's TFP (that is A =Ae'').$isa
parameter between zero and one that measures the country's ability to absorb
productivity improvements originating from the rest of the world, and is assumed to be
a negative function of the level of trade distortions in the economy ().
= $(ô);$'< 0, (2)
where ô is an index of trade distortions that takes a higher value when international
trade, both in imports and/or exports, becomes more distorted.
Parameter c is the basic rate of domestic productivity growth or innovation,
which for simplicity is assumed to be exogenous. On the other hand, (y(A*A)IA)is
the "catch-up" term that says that domestic productivity growth wifi be faster in nations7
whose stock of knowledge lags further behind the world's accumulated stock of
appropriable knowledge.9
In this setting the path through time of domestic TFP will be given by:'°
A, =- (---)t + (
+ (i) -) e . (3)
It follows from equation (3) that the long run rate of growth of domestic TFP will
depend on whether ('y-a-flc,)0. If (y-a-/3) > 0, in the steady-state TFP will
grow at the rate of world's productivity .Thismeans that the level of domestic TFP
(and of GDP) will be a function of the degree of trade intervention, with higher trade
distortions resulting in a lower level of real income. A key implication of this result is
that countries that engage in trade liberalization programs will be characterized, during
the transition between two steady states, by higher rates of productivity growth and
thus, by faster rates of GDP growth.
A second case appears when (y--/3c) < 0. Long run TFP growth (A/A)
will depend on how large the world's rate of growth of TFP (w) is relative to the
domestic rate of productivity improvement. If o > (a-)/(l -j3), domestic TFP will
grow in the steady state at the world rate .If,however, w < (a-'y)/(l-), and ('y-
c-$w) < 0, the long run equilibrium rate of TFP growth will be equal to (a+/3w-
ô)," and will depend negatively on ô, the country's level of trade distortions. That
is, in this case more open countries (those with low 5) will grow faster during steady
state equilibrium. This is because in this case the domestic source of technological8
inventions is strong enough s to drive, even in the steady state, the aggregate rate of
technological innovations)2
The model developed above suggests that TFP growth will depend on the
degree of trade distortions in the economy, and on a catch-up term that measures the
gap between the country's and "the world's' level of productivity. I constructed a
cross country data set to test these implications of the model. More specifically, I
estimated equations of the following type:
p= b0+ b1â + b2g + Ea x, + , (4)
where p is the average rate of growth of TFP in country n; &,is,as before, an
index of trade distortions; g,, is the catch-up term; the xi's are other possible
determinants of TFP growth; andis an error term.
Recently, Barro (1991), Edwards (1992), and Roubim and Sala-i-Martin (1992),
among others, have suggested that in addition to the degree of openness, productivity
growth will also be affected by the following factors: (a) human capital, usually
measured by schooling attainment; (b) the importance of government in the economy
measured by the ratio of government expenditure to GDP; (c) the degree of political
instability; and (d) the inflation rate.'3 In the estimations of equation (4) reported
below, I have incorporated these variables as possible determinants of productivity
growth.9
11.1 Data Definitions and Sources
TFP Growth: A problem faced in the estimation of equations of the type of (4)
refers to the measurement of TFP growth. In particular, it is difficult to obtain long
time series of capital stocks for a large number of countries. In this paper I deal with
this problem by constructing three measures of TFP growth from the residuals of
country-specific GDP growth regressions. These indices are denoted TFP1, TFP2
and TFP3. The specific methodology used in constructing each of these indices is
presented in the Appendix.14
Trade Distortions: Traditionally, studies that have investigated the relationship
between trade policy and economic performance have had difficulties measuring the
extent of trade distortions. In this paper I tackle this problem by using two variables:
first, in most of the basic estimates I use the ratio of total revenue from taxes on
foreign trade --importtariffs plus export taxes --overtotal trade as a proxy for trade
distortions. This variable is measured as an average for 1971-82. Since this variable,
denoted TRADETAX, measures the 'true" extent of trade distortions with error, in the
estimation of the TFP growth equation I also use an instrumental variable technique
that tries to correct for measurement error. The second proxy I use is the 1971-82
average trade dependency ratio --importsplus exports as a percentage of GDP. These
two indices of trade distortions were constructed with raw data obtained from the IMF.
Catch-Up Term: Following the recent literature on endogenous growth (Barro
1991; Edwards 1992), I use initial GDP per capita --foryear 1971 in this case --asa
measure of the gap between a particular country's level of productivity and that of the10
world. This variable is denoted as GDP71; the data were obtained from Summers and
Heston (1989). The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative, indicating
that countries with a lower initial per capita GDP have more "catching up" to do and,
thus, will grow faster.
Human Capital: I used two indices. The first one is the attainment of
secondary education in 1981. The second one is the increase in secondary education
coverage between 1961 and 1981. When alternative indices, such as secondary and
higher education were used, the results obtained were not altered. The data were
obtained from the World Bank's World Development Report. The coefficient of this
variable is expected to be positive.
Role of Government: This index is defined as the share of government over
GDP, and is taken from Summers and Heston (1989). Barro (1991) has argued that
this coefficient should be negative, capturing the effect that greater government
activities tend, in general, to crowd-out the private sector.
Political Instability: This variable was defined as the average perceived
probability of government change, and was obtained from Cukierman, Edwards and
Tabellini (1992).15 Its coefficient in the TFP growth equations is expected to be
negative, reflecting the fact that in politically unstable situations economic agents do
not devote their full energies to pursue economic objectives.
Inflation Tax: This variable was defmed as the average collection of inflation
tax for 1971-82 and was computed as m, where 7isthe rate of inflation and m11
is the ratio of Ml to GDP. -The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative,
reflecting the effects of higher inflation on uncertainty and economic activity.
11.2 Econometric Results
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results obtained from the estimation of several
versions of equation (4). While Table 2 contains weighted least squares estimates —
withpopulation in 1971 as weight --forall three measures of TFPgrowth;16Table 3
presents instrumental variables regressions for the TFP1 definition of productivity
growth. (When the other two indices were used, the results were not altered
significantly.)
As can be seen from these tables, the results are highly satisfactory. Almost
every coefficient has the expected sign and is significant at conventional levels.
Particularly important for the discussion pursued in this paper is the fact that in every
regression the proxies for trade distortions and openness are highly significant.
Moreover, the computation of standardized beta coefficients indicate that trade
impediments are the second most important explanatory variable of TFP growth, after
the "catch-up" term.'7
As pointed out above both the TAXTRADE coefficient and the trade
dependency ratio are imperfect proxies of trade distortions. In particular, they do not
capture directly the role of quantitative restrictions on trade. In order to deal with this
measurement error problem I estimated instrumental variables versions of some of
these equations. In re-estimating equations (4.1) and (4.2) I used the trade penetration
ratio of imports to GDP as instruments for TAXTRADE.'1 The results obtained are12
presented in Table 3. As can be seen they confirm those discussed previously, and
provide additional support to the view that, after controlling for other factors, countries
with more open and less distorted foreign trade sectors have tended to exhibit a faster
rate of growth of total factor productivity, over the lon2 run, than those nations with a
more distorted external sector. The results presented in Tables 2 and 3, however,
provide no information on the transition from a closed economy to one that is more•
open and integrated to the rest of the world. I turn to those issues in the next three
sections.
ifi. Policy Issues During a Trade Liberalization Transition
The analysis presented in the preceding section provides support for the
hypothesis that in the long run more open economies have experienced faster
productivity growth than countries that distort international trade. However, as the
former communist countries have recently found out, designing a strategy for moving
from a controlled to a liberalized economy is not an easy task.
Two fund4rnental problems have to be addressed in the transition towards freer
trade: first, it is important to determine what is the adequate speed of reform. For a
long time analysts argued for gradual liberalization programs (Little et al. 1971,
Michaely, 1985). The reason for this is that, according to these authors, gradual
reforms would give finns time for restructuring their productive processes and, thus,
would result in low dislocation costs in the form of unemployment and bankruptcies.
These reduced adjustment costs would, in turn, provide the needed politicalsupport for13
the liberalization program. -Recently, however, the gradualist position has been under
attack. There is an increasing agreement that slower reforms tend to lack credibility,
inhibiting firms from actually engaging in serious restructuring. Moreover, the
experience of Argentina in the 1970s has shown that a gradual (and preannounced)
reform allows those firms negatively affected by it to (successfully) lobby against the
reduction in tariffs. According to this line of reasoning, faster reforms are more
credible, and thus tend to be sustained through time (Stockman, 1982).
The thinking on the speed of reform has also been influenced by recent
empirical work on the short run unemployment consequences of trade liberalization.
Contrary to the traditional conventional wisdom, a study directed by Michaely et al.
(1991) on liberalization episodes in 19 countries strongly suggests that, even in the
short run, the costs of reform can be small. Although contracting industries will
release workers, those expanding sectors positively affected by the reform process will
tend to create a large number of employment positions. The Michaely et al. (1991)
study shows that in sustainable and successful reforms theeffect --thatis the effect
that nets out contracting and expanding sectors --onshort run employment has been
negligible. A key question, then, is what determines a successful reform? Most
historical studies on the subject have shown that maintaining a "competitive' real
exchange rate during the transition is one of, if not the most, important determinant of
successful trade reforms. A competitive, that is depreciated, real exchange rate
encourages exports, and helps maintain external equilibrium at the time the reduction
in tariffs has made imports cheaper.14
The second problem -that has to be addressed when designing a liberalization
strategy refers to the sequencing of reform (Edwards, 1984). This issue was first
addressed in the 1980s in discussions dealing with the Southern Cone experiences, and
emphasized the macroeconomic consequences of alternative sequences. It was
generally agreed that resolving the fiscal imbalance and attaining some degree of
macroeconomic reform should constitute the first stage of a structural reform. On
subsequent steps, most agreed that the trade liberalization reform should precede the
liberalization of the capital account, and that financial reform should be implemented
simultaneously with trade reform.
The behavior of the real exchange rate is at the heart of this policy prescription.
The central issue is that liberalizing the capital account would, under most conditions,
result in large capital inflows and in an appreciation of the real exchange rate
(McKinnon, 1982; Edwards, 1984; Harberger, 1985). The problem with this is that an
appreciation of the real exchange rate will send the "wrong' signal to the real sector,
frustrating the reallocation of resources called for by the trade reform. The effects of
this real exchange rate appreciation will be particularly serious if, as argued by
Edwards (1984), the transitional period will be characterized by 'abnormally" high
capital inflows, and the economy is characterized by high adjustment costs. If,
however, the opening of the capital account is postponed, the real sector will be able to
adjust and the new allocation of resources will be consolidated. According to this
view, only at this time should the capital account be liberalized.15
More recent discussions on the sequencing of reform have expanded the
analysis, and have included other markets. An increasing number of authors has
argued that the reform of the labor market --andin particular the removal of
distortions that discourage labor mobility --shouldprecede the trade reform, as well as
the relaxation of capital controls. It is even possible that the liberalization of trade in
the presence of highly distorted labor markets will be counterproductive, generating
overall welfare losses in the country in question (Edwards, 1992).
As the preceding discussion has suggested, there is little doubt that the behavior
of the real exchange rate is a key element during a trade liberalization transition.
According to traditional manuals on "how to liberalize", a large devaluation should
constitute the first step in a trade reform process. Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger
(1978) have pointed out that in the presence of quotas and import licenses a (real)
exchange rate depreciation will reduce the rents received by importers, shifting relative
prices in favor of export-oriented activities and, thus, reducing the extent of the anti-
export bias.'9
Maintaining a depreciated and competitive real exchange rate during a trade
liberalization process is also important in order to avoid an explosion in imports
growth and a balance of payments crisis. Under most circumstances a reduction in the
extent of protection will tend to generate a rapid and immediate surge in imports. On
the other hand, the expansion of exports usually takes some time. Consequently, there
is a danger that a trade liberalization reform will generate a large trade balance
disequilibrium in the short run. This, however, will not happen if there is a16
depreciated real exchange rate that encourages exports and helps maintain imports in
check. However, many countries have historically failed to sustain a depreciated real
exchange rate during the transition. This has mainly been the result of expansionary
macroeconomic policies, and has resulted in speculation, international reserves losses
and, in many cases, in the reversal of the reform effort. In the conclusions to the
massive World Bank project on trade reform Michaely et al. (1991) succinctly
summarizes the key role of the real exchange rate in determining the success of
liberalization programs: "The long term performance of the real exchange rate clearly
differentiates "liberalizers' from "non-liberalizers' (p. 119). Edwards (1989) used
data on 39 exchange rate crises and found that in almost every case real exchange rate
overvaluation ended up drastic increases in the degree of protectionism.
In the next section I address in some detail the recent liberalization experiences
in Latin America, I document the extent and depth of the reforms and I investigate
their impact on productivity growth and exports behavior. In Section VI, I deal with
the recent evolution of real exchange rates in Latin America.
IV. Recent Trade Liberalization Reforms in Latin America
During the last few years trade liberalization reforms have swept through Latin
America; every country in the region has today a significantly more open trade sector
than in the early and mid-1980s. The pioneer in the liberalization process was Chile,
which between 1975 and 1979 unilaterally eliminated QRs and reduced import tariffs to
a uniform level of 10%. After a brief interlude with higher tariffs (at the uniform17
level of 30%) Chile currently has a uniform tariff of 11% and no licenses or other
forms of quantitative controls. Uruguay implemented a reform in 1978, and after a
brief reversal, push forward once again in 1986. Bolivia and Mexico embarked on
their reforms in 1985-86, followed by a series of countries in the late 1980s. At the
current time a number of countries, including Brazil, are proceeding steadily with
scheduled rounds of tariff reduction and the dismantling of quantitative restrictions.
However, it is still unclear whether all these reforms will be sustained, becoming a
permanent feature of the Latin economies, or whether some of them will be reversed.
Recent (October 1992) developments in Argentina indeed suggest that in some
countries higher tariffs may be implemented, once again, in the near future.
The Latin American trade reforms have been characterized by four basic
elements: (1) The reduction of the coverage of non-tariff bathers, including quotas
and prohibitions; (2) The reduction of the average level of import tariffs; (3) The
reduction of the degree of dispersion of the tariff structure; (4) The reduction or
elimination of export taxes. In this section I document the extent of the recent
liberalization programs, and I provide a preliminary evaluation of the effects of these
reforms on productivity growth and exports expansion.
IV. 1 The Policies
IV. 1.1 Non-Tariff Barriers
A fundamental component of the trade reform programs has been the
elimination, or at least the severe reduction, of non-tariff barriers coverage. During
the early and mid-1980s in some countries, such as Colombia and Peru, more than18
50% of import positions were subject to licenses or outright prohibitions. In Mexico
NTBs coverage reached almost 100% of import categories in 1984, as was the case in
most of Central America in 1984 (Fable 1).
Table 4 contains data on protectionism in 1985-87 and 1991-92, and shows that
inalmost every country the coverage of NTBs has been dramatically reduced.2° In
fact, in a number of cases NTBs have been fully eliminated. The process through
which NTBs have been eased has varied from country to country. In some cases, such
as Honduras, they were initially replaced by (quasi) equivalent import tariffs, and then
slowly phased out. In other countries, like Chile, NTBs were rapidly eliminated
without a compensating hike in tariffs.
As Table 4 shows, in spite of the progress experienced in the last few years,
significant NTB coverage remains in a number of countries. In most cases these non-
tariff barriers correspond to agricultural products. For example, in Mexico
approximately 60% of the agriculture's sector tariff positions are still subject to import
licenses in mid-1992. In fact, an important feature of the region's liberalization
programs is that they have proceeded much slower in agriculture than in industry.
This has largely been the result of the authorities desire to isolate agriculture from
fluctuations in world prices, and unfair trade practices by foreign countries.2'
However, as a recent study by Valdes has shown (1992) this approach based on NTBs
entails serious efficiency costs. Slowly, however, more and more countries are
addressing these concerns by replacing these quantitative restrictions by variable
levies.19
IV.1.2 Tariff Dispersion
The import substitution development strategy pursued for decades in Latin
America created highly dispersed protective structures. According to the World Bank
(1987), Brazil, Chile and Colombia had some of the broadest ranges of effective rates
of protection in the world during the 1960s. Also, Heitger (1987) shows that during
the 1960s Chile had the highest rate of tariff dispersion in the World --witha standard
deviation of 634% —closelyfollowed by Colombia and Uruguay. Cardoso and Hel-
wege (1991) have pointed out that highly dispersed protective structures generate high
welfare costs, by increasing uncertainty and negatively affecting the investment
process. These highly dispersed tariffs and NTBs were the result of decades of
lobbying by different sectors to obtain preferential treatment. As the relative power of
the different lobbies changed, so did their tariff concessions and the protective
landscape.
An important goal of the Latin trade reforms has been the reduction of the
degree of dispersion of import tariffs. Table 4 contains data on the tariff range for a
group of countries for two points in time --mid-l980s(1985-87) and 199 1-92 --and
clearly document the fact that the reforms have indeed reduced the degree of tariff
dispersion.
In many cases reducing tariff dispersion has meant increasing tariffs on goods
that were originally exempted from import duties. In fact, Table 4 shows that in the
many countries the minimum tariff was zero percent in the mid-1980s. Generally,
zero tariffs have been applied to intermediate inputs used in the manufacturing pro-20
cess.n From a political economy perspective the process of raising some tariffs, while
maintaining a pro-liberalization rhetoric, has not always been easy. Those sectors that
had traditional benefitted from the exemptions, suddenly saw their privileged situation
come to an end and tried to oppose them strongly.
An important question addressed by policymakers throughout the region, is by
how much should tariff dispersion be reduced? Should the reforms implement a
uniform tariff, or is some (small) degree dispersion desirable? From a strict welfare
perspective uniform tariffs are only a advisable under very special cases. However,
they have a political-economy appeal. More specifically, a uniform tariff system is
very transparent, making it difficult for the authorities to grant special treatments to
particular firms or sectors (Harberger, 1990).
IV.l.3 Avera2e Tariffs
Reducing the average degree of protection is, perhaps, the fundamental policy
goal of trade liberalization reforms. Traditional policy manuals on the subject suggest
that once the exchange rate has been devalued and quantitative restrictions have been
reduced or eliminated, tariffs should be slashed in a way such that both their range and
average is reduced. Table 4 contains data on average total tariffs (tariffs plus
paratariffs) in 1985 and 199 1-92. As can be seen, the extent of tariff reduction has
been significant in almost every country. Even those nations that have acted somewhat
cautiously in the reform front, such as Brazil and Ecuador, have experienced important
cuts in import tariffs, allowing a more competitive environment, and reducing the
degree of and-export bias of the trade regime.21
Countriesthat have embarkedon tradeliberalizationin recent years have moved
at a much faster speed than those nationsthatdecided to open up earlier. There has,
in fact, been a clearchangein what is perceived to be our abrupt and pj removal of
imports impediments. What only15years ago were seen as brutally fast reforms, are
now looked at as mild and gradual liberalizations. When Chile initiated the trade
reform in 1975 most analysts thought that the announced tariff reduction from an
average of 52% to 10% in four and a half years was an extremely aggressive move
that would cause major dislocations, including large increases in unemployment. The
view on the speed of reform has become very different in the early 1990s, when an
increasing number of countries have been opening up their external sectors very
rapidly. For instance, Colombia slashed (total) import tariffs by 65% in one year,
reducing them from 34% in 1990 to 12% in 1991. This fast approach to liberalization
has also been followed by Argentina and Nicaragua who eliminated quantitative
restrictions in one bold move and slashed import tariffs from an average of 110% in
1990 to 15% in March of 1992. As suggested previously, the speed of trade reforms
has been directly related to the belief that faster reforms are more credible and, thus,
more likely to be sustained through time.
IV.1.4 Exchange Rate Policy
In the vast majority of the countries the first step in the trade reform process
was the implementation of large (nominal) devaluations. In many cases this measure
represented a unification of the exchange rate market. Most countries implemented
large exchange rate adjustments as early as 1982 in order to face the urgencies of the22
adjustment process. The purpose of these policies was to generate xexchangerate
devaluations, as a way to reduce the degree of anti-export bias of incentives systems.
Many countries adopted crawling peg regimes to protect the real exchange rate
from the effects of inflation. Although these systems helped avoid the erosion of
competitiveness, they also added fuel to the inflationary process. They introduced a
certain degree of inflationary inertia, and have contributed in many countries to the
slow reduction of the rate of inflation. More recently, a number of countries has
begun to use the exchange rate as an anchor in order to bring down inflation. This has
resulted in the slowing down of the rate of crawl below inflation differentials or, in
some cases, in the fixing of the exchange rate as in Argentina.
Table 5containsdata on real exchange rates for a group of LAC countries for
1980, 1987 and 1991. As is customary in Latin America, an increase in the index
represents a real exchange rate depreciation and thus an improvement in the degree of
competitiveness. As can be seen between 1980 and 1987 almost every country in the
sample experienced very large real depreciations. In many cases, however, these have
been partially reversed in the last few years. This has been the consequence of a
combination of factors, including the inflow of large volumes of foreign capital into
these countries since 1990, and the use of the exchanger rate as the cornerstone of the
disinflation policies. This issue is addressed in greater detail in Section V.
IV.2 Adjustment and Productivity
The relaxation of trade impediments has had a fundamental impact on the
region's economies. Suddenly, Latin America's industry which, to a large extent had23
• developed and grown behind protective walls, was forced to compete. Many firms
have not been able to survive this shock, and have become bankrupt. Others,
however, have faced the challenge of lower protection by embarking on major
restructuring, and increasing their level of productivity.
The ability (and willingness) of firms to implement significant adjustment
depend on two main factors: the degree of credibility of the reform, and the level of
distortions in the labor market. If entrepreneurs believe that the reform will not persist
through time, there will be no incentives to incur in the costs of adjusting the product
mix and of increasing the degree of productive efficiency. In fact, if the reform is
perceived as temporary the optimal behavior is not to adjust; instead it is profitable to
speculate through the accumulation of imported durable goods. This was, as
Rodriguez (1982) has documented, the case in Argentina during the failed Martinez de
Hoz's reforms.
Labor market conditions affect the adjustment process in several ways. First,
in order to survive, firms facing stiffer foreign competition have to increase labor
productivity, which in many cases means reducing the number of workers. This
reduction in employment will tend to be offset by new hires in expanding firms in the
sectors with comparative advantage. Many times, however, existing labor market
regulations are extremely cumbersome, inhibiting the adjustment process, and forcing
out of business firms that are structurally viable in the long run. Additionally, labor
market distortions negatively affect the investment process, including direct foreign
investments.2624
In their studies on the interaction between labor markets and structural reforms
Krueger (1980) and Michaely et al. (1991) found that most successful trade reforms
have indeed resulted in major increases in labor productivity. This has been the case
in some of the early Latin American reformers for which there are data. For example,
according to Edwards and Edwards (1991) labor productivity in the Chilean
manufacturing sector increased at an average annual rate of 13.4% between 1978 and
1981. On the other hand, the available evidence suggests that the increases in labor
productivity in the Mexican manufacturing sector in the post reform period has been
moderate. According to World Bank (1992) data, labor productivity in Mexico barely
increased between 1988 and 1981 --theindex went from 92.7 to 105.1. In a recent
study Ibarra (1992) has calculated that labor productivity in the Mexican manufacturing
sector --excludingthe maguiladora sector --hasincreased at an average rate of 2.3%
per annum.
As discussed in Section II, recent models of growth have suggested that
countries that are more open to the rest of the world will exhibit a faster rate of
technological improvement. From an empirical point of view this means that countries
that open up their external sectors, and engage in trade liberalization reforms, will
experience an increase in total factor productivity growth relative to the pre-reform
period. Table 6 contains data on the change in total factor productivity growth in the
period following the implementation of trade liberalization reform in six Latin
Countries.v As can be seen, Chile and Costa Rica, two of the earlier reformers,
experienced very large increases in TFP growth in the post reform period. The results25
for Chile coincide with those obtained by Edwards (1985), who found that in the late
1970s, after the trade reforms had been completed, TFP growth was approximately
three times higher than the historical average.28 Although the outcome has been less
spectacular, Argentina and Uruguay still exhibit substantial improvements in
productivity growth in the period following the opening up. Bolivia, on the other
hand, presents a flat profile of TFP growth. Sturzenegger (1992) argues that the very
slow improvement in Bolivian productivity growth has been, to a large extent, the
result of negative terms of trade shocks and, in particular of the collapse of the tin
market.
Perhaps the most interesting and puzzling result in Table 6 is the slight decline
in aggregate TFP growth in Mexico after the reforms. Martin (1992) shows that this
finding is robust to alternative methods of measuring TFP growth, including different
procedures for correcting for capacity utilization. Also, Harberger (1992) finds a
slowing down of TFP growth in Mexico in 1986-90 relative to 1975-82. However, the
aggregate nature of the TFP growth data in Table 6 tends to obscure the actual sectoral
response to the trade reform. According to new theories on endogenous growth, faster
productivity wifi be observed in those sectors where protectionism has been reduced,
and not in those still subject to trade bathers or other forms of regulations.
A distinctive characteristic of the Mexican reform is that, contrary to the
Chilean case, it has been uneven. In particular, while most of the manufacturing
sector --withthe exception of automobiles --hasexperienced a significant reduction in
protection, agriculture continues to be subject to relatively high tariffs and substantial26
nontariff barriers. Moreover, until very recently the Mexican land tenure system was
subject to substantial distortions that, among other things, severely restricted the
market for land --thefJjo system. Additionally, during much of the post-debt crisis
period large fragments of services sector --includingtelecommunications and financial
services --wereunder direct government control and subject to distortions.
Table 7 contains data on TFP growth in Mexico's manufacturing sector for
194089.29 Interestingly enough, these figures indicate that in the post-trade reform
period the rate of productivity growth in the Mexican manufacturing sector has
exceeded every subperiod since 1940, for which there are data. This provides some
evidence in favor of the view that, once the sectors actually subject to increased
competition are considered, Mexican productivity growth has indeed improved after the
trade reform. It should be noted, however, that recent TFP growth in manufacturing
in Mexico (see Table 8 for disaggregated data) has not been as large as in Chile's post-
reform period, where some sectors experienced growth in TFPofthe order of 15% in
1978-82.'° There are a number of possible explanations for this marked difference in
behavior, including the uncertainties about NAFTA's approval resulted in the
postponement of investment in some of the key manufacturing sectors subject to
increased foreign exposure.
By and large, however, the data analyzed in this subsection provides broad
support to the position that total factor productivity growth has tended to increase in
the period following major trade reforms in Latin America.27
IV.3 Trade Reforms and Exports
An important goal of the reforms has been to reduce the traditional degree of
anti-export bias of Latin American trade regimes, and to generate a surge in exports.
This reduction of the bias is expected to take place through three channels: a more
competitive --thatis more devalued --realexchange rate; a reduction in the cost of
importeo capital goods and intermediate inputs used in the production of exportable;
and a direct shift in relative prices in favor of exports.
The volume of international trade in Latin America, and in particular of
exports, increased significantly after the reforms were initiated.3' For example, while
for the region as a whole the volume of exports grew at an annual rate of only 2.0%
between 1970 and 1980, it grew at a rate of 5.5% between 1980 and 1985, and at an
annual average of 6.7% between 1986 and 1990.32 Although, strictly spealdng, it is
not possible to fully attribute this export surge to the opening up reforms, there is
significant country-specific evidence suggesting that a more open economy, and in
particular a more depreciated real exchange rate, has positively affected exports
growth.33 Some countries, especially Costa Rica, have accompanied the opening up
process with the implementation of a battery of export promotion schemes, including
tax credits --throughthe "Certificado de Abono Tributario" --dutyfree imports, and
income tax exemptions. However, some authors, including Nogues and Gulati (1992),
have argued that these systems have not been an effective way of encouraging exports.
Table 9 presents detailed country level data on the rate of growth of the total
value of exports (in constant dollars) for three different periods. Table 10, on the28
other hand, contains information on the evolution of exports volume throughout the
period. A number of facts emerge from these tables. First, while there has been a
rapid growth in exports for the region as a whole, there are nontrivial variations across
countries; in some cases there has even been a decline in the real value of exports --
thisis the case, for example, of Peru. Second, exports performance during the two
sub-periods (1982-87 and 1987-90) has not been homogeneous. In the majority of the
countries exports performed significantly better during 1987-90, than in the previous
five years reflecting, among other things, the fact that it takes some time for exports to
actually respond to greater incentives.
An interesting fact that emerges from these tables is that in the country that has
lagged behind in terms of trade reform --Ecuador--theperformance of exports
volume has been, in the recent years, below the 1970-80 historical average. On the
other hand, in two of the early reformers --Boliviaand Chile --exportshave had a
very strong behavior in the 1987-90 subperiod.
The case of Chile is particularly interesting. Since most of its liberalization
effort was undertaken prior to 1980, there are enough data points as to provide a more
detailed evaluation of export response to the new regime. Between 1975 and 1980 --
whentariffs were reduced to a uniform 10% and NTBs were completely eliminated --
thebehavior of Chilean exports was spectacular, growing (in volume terms) at an
average of 12% per year --manytimes higher than the historical average of 1960-70
of only 2.6% per annum. What is particularly impressive is that most of the exports29
surge has taken place in the-nontraditional sector, including manufacturing, agriculture
and fishing products (CEPAL, 1991).
Among the early reformers, Mexico exhibits a rather slow rate of growth of
total exports in the post reform period than during 1970-80. This, however, is largely
an illusion stemming from the fact that during the l970s Mexico's oil production
increased substantially —ata rate exceeding 18% per year. When nontraditional
exports are considered the post-reform performance is remarkable with an annual
average rate of growth for 1985-91 exceeding 25%.
Astated objective of trade reforms has been to increase the degree of
diversification of exports. Tables 11 and 12 contain data on the share of nontraditional
exports and manufacturing exports for a large number of countries, and show that in
the period following the trade reforms their importance has increased steadily. Also,
in the majority of the countries the share of the ten more important export goods in
total exports has declined significantly in the last few years (CEPAL, 1991).
A critical question is whether the rapid growth and diversification of exports in
Latin America will be sustained, or whether it will be a temporary phenomenon. To a
large extent this will depend on the policies undertaken, and on the behavior of
variables such as the real exchange rate. This is the subject of the next section.
V. Recent Real Exchanee Rate Behavior In Latin America
In the last years, competitive real exchange rates have been at the center of the
vigorous performance of most of Latin America's external sectors. Recently,30
however, in most Latin countries real exchange rates have experienced rapid real
appreciations (Figure 1). These developments have generated considerable concern
among poicymakers and political leaders. A number of observers have, in fact,
argued that the reduction in exports competitiveness are negatively affecting the most
dynamic sectors in these economies, reducing growth and employment expansion.35
These real appreciations have been the result of two basic factors: first, the
use, in many countries of the exchange rate policy as an anti-inflationary tool and,
second, massive capital inflows into Latin America that have made foreign exchange
'overabundant".
In the late 1980s some analysts, including the staff of the IMF, argued that the
crawling peg regimes adopted by most of Latin America after the debt crisis had
become excessively inflationary. In particular, it was argued that crawling pegs
introduce substantial inflation inertia. According to this view exchange rate policy in
the developing countries should move towards greater rigidity --andeven complete
fixity --asa way to introduce financial discipline, provide a nominal anchor, and
reduce inflation.36
A number of Latin countries have, in fact, decided to use an exchange rate
anchor as a way to reduce inflation. In practice they have done this by either slowing
down the rate of the crawl —asin Mexico and Chile, to some extent --orby adopting
a completely fixed nominal exchange rate --asin Argentina and Nicaragua. Much of
the recent enthusiasm for fixed nominal exchange rates is intellectually rooted on the
modern credibility and time consistency literature.37 According to this approach,31
which was pioneered by Calvo (1978), and Kydland and Prescott (1977), governments
that have the discretion to alter the nominal exchange rate --asin the crawling peg
system --willtend to abuse their power, introducing an inflationary bias into the
economy. The reason for this is that under a set of plausible conditions, such as the
existence of labor market rigidities that preclude the economy from reaching full
employment, it will be optimal for the government to "surprise" the private sector
through unexpected devaluations.3S
By engineering (unexpected) devaluations the government hopes to induce a
reduction in real wages and, thus, an increase in employment and a boost in output.
Naturally, in equilibrium the public will be aware of this incentive faced by the
authorities, and will react to it by anticipating the devaluation surprises and, hence,
rendering them ineffective. As a consequence of this strategic interaction between the
government and the private sector, the economy will reach a high inflation plateau.
What is particularly interesting about this result is that this inflationary bias will be
present even if it is explicitly assumed that the government has an aversion for
inflation. This is because the government perceives that the marginal benefits of
higher inflation --associatedwith the increase in employment once nominal wages
have been set --outweighits marginal costs.3°
An important feature of the credibility literature is that under most
circumstances policy commitment is welfare-superior to discretionary policy. If the
government can credibly commit itself to low (or no) inflation, society will be better
off: employment will be the same as in the discretionary policy case, but inflation will32
be lower. The problem, however, is that-governments have a hard time making
credible commitments. In the absence of effective constraints that will tie the
government's hands, any promise of low inflationary policy will not be credible and,
thus, will be self-defeating.
A key policy implication of this literature is that defining (and implementing)
constraints that will make government pre-commitments credible, will result in an
improvement in society's welfare. It is here where fixed (or predetermined) exchange
rates come into the picture. It has been argued that the adoption of a fixed exchange
rate will constrain governments ability to surprise the private sector through
unexpected devaluations. Promises of fiscal discipline will become credible and
private sector actions will not elicit successive rounds of inflationary actions.4° In
particular, it has been argued that fixed exchange rates provide a renutatignal
constraint on government behavior. The authorities know that if they undertake overly
expansive credit policy they wifi be forced to abandon the parity and devalue. As the
recent (mid-1992) crisis of the ERM has shown, exchange rate crises can indeed
shatter the reputation of politicians.
In spite of its elegant appeal, this view has, in its simplest incarnation, some
serious problems. First, in these simple settings exchange rate policy has a very
limited role. In fact, in most of these models its only effect is to alter the domestic
rate of inflation and, through it, the government perceives it as altering real wages.
However, in most modern exchange rate models, nominal devaluations can also help
accommodate shocks to real exchange rate fundamentals --includingshocks to the33
terms of trade --helpingto avoid RER misalignment.41 Second, in economies with
stochastic shocks, contingent exchange rate rules can, at least in principle, be superior
to fixed rates (Flood and Isard 1988). Third, it is not clear why a country that can
credibly commit itself to unilaterally fixing the exchange rate, cannot commit itself to
providing a monetary anchor.
However, one of the most serious limitations of the nominal exchange rate
anchor policy is that, under almost every circumstance, once the exchange rate is
fixed, other prices --includingwages --willcontinue to increase, generating a change
in relative prices in favor of nontradables. This has indeed been the case in both
Argentina and Nicaragua, the two countries in Latin America that in the early 1990s
adopted sthctly fixed exchange rates as a way to drastically reduce inflation. In both
cases the stabilization programs were based on a severe fiscal correction that virtually
eliminated the fiscal deficit, in restrictive credit, and in a nominal exchange rate
anchor. Although this policy succeeded in both countries in greatly reducing inflation,
it has resulted in serious relative price misalignment. In Argentina this has been
reflected in the fact that wholesale price inflation, which is heavily influenced by
tradables, is only 3% per year, while consumer price inflation --highlydependent on
nontradables --exceeds18% per year. In Nicaragua tradable-related inflation rates
have been very low (in the order of 2-3 percent) while nontradable inflation has
exceeded 30% in the last 12 months.
Mexico followed a variant of the exchange rate anchor policy, announcing a
predetermined rate of devaluation at a pace deliberately below ongoing inflation. The34
purpose of this policy has been to both anchor tradables prices and reduce
expectations. However, since domestic inflation has systematically exceeded the pre-
determined rate of devaluation, Mexico has experienced a sizable real appreciation
which has exceeded 35%between1985 and mid-1992.
The second cause behind the generalized real appreciations in Latin America
has been the large increase in capital inflows into the region in the last two years. As
Table 13 shows, after eight years of negative resource transfers, there has been a
significant turnaround in 1991-92 (see Table 14 for more disaggregated data). This
increased availability of foreign funds has affected the real exchange rate through
increased aggregate expenditure. A proportion of the newly available resources has
been spent on nontradables --includingin the real estate sector --puttingpressure on
their relative prices and on domestic inflation. An interesting feature of the recent
capital movements is that a large proportion corresponds to portfolio investment and,
relatively little is direct foreign investment.
Real exchange rate appreciations generated by increased capital inflows is not a
completely new phenomenon in Latin America. In the late 1970s most countries in the
region, but especially the Southern Cone nations, were flooded with foreign resources
that led to large real appreciations. The fact that this previous episode ended in the
debt crisis has added dramaticism to the current concern on the possible negative
effects of these capital flows.
Whether these capital movements are temporary --andthus subject to sudden
reversals as in 1982 --isparticularly important in evaluating their possible35
consequences. In a recent study Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1992) argue that the
most important causes behind the generalized inflow of resources are external. In
particular, their empirical analysis suggests that the recession in the industrialized
world and the reduction in U.S. interest rates are the two main reasons that have
triggered these capital movements. These authors suggest that once these world
economic conditions change, the volume capital of capital flowing to Latin America
will be reduced. This means that at that point the pressure over the real exchange rate
will subside and a real exchange rate depreciation will be required.
The countries in the region have tried to cope with the real appreciation
pressures in several ways. Colombia, for instance, tried to sterilize the accumulation
of reserves by placing domestic bonds (OMAs) in the local market in 1991 •42
However,in order to place these bonds the local interest rate had to increase, making
them relatively more attractive. This generated a widening interest rate differential in
favor of Colombia, which attracted new capital flows that, in order to be sterilized,
required new bond placements. This process generated a vicious cycle that contributed
to a very large accumulation of domestic debt, without significantly affecting the real
exchange rate. This experience shows vividly the difficulties faced by the authorities
wishing to handle real exchange rate movements. In particular, this case indicates that
real shocks --suchas an increase in foreign capital inflows --cannotbe tackled
successfully using exclusively monetary policy instruments.
Argentina has recently tried to deal with the real appreciation by engineering a
'pseudo" devaluation through a simultaneous increase in import tariffs and export36
subsidies. Although it is too early to know how this measure will affect the degree of
competitiveness in the country, preliminary computations suggest that the magnitude of
the adjustment obtained via tariffs-cum-subsidies package may be rather small. Mexico
has followed a different route, and has decided to postpone the adoption of a
completely fixed exchange rate. In October of 1992 the pace of the daily nominal
exchange rate adjustment was doubled to 40 cents. As in the case of Argentina, it is
too early to evaluate how effective these measures have been in dealing with the real
appreciation trend.
Chile has tackled the real appreciation by implementing a broad set of
measures, including conducting exchange rate policy relative to a three currencies
basket, imposing reserve requirements on capital inflows and undertaking limited
sterilization operations. In spite of this multi-front approach, Chile has not avoided
real exchange rate pressures. Between December of 1991 and July 1992 the Chilean
bilateral real exchange rate appreciated almost 10%. As a result of this, exporters
and agriculture producers have been mounting increasing pressure on the government
for special treatment, arguing that by allowing the real exchange rate to appreciate an
implicit contract has been broken. This type of political reaction is, in fact, becoming
more and more generalized throughout the region, adding a difficult social dimension
to the real exchange rate issue.
Although there is no easy way to handle the real appreciation pressures,
historical experience shows that there are, at least, two possible avenues that the
authorities can follow. First, in those countries where the dominant force behind real37
exchange rate movements is price inertia in the presence of nominal exchange rate
anchor policies, the adoption of a pragmatic crawling peg system will usually help.
This means that, to some extent, the inflationary targets will have to be less ambitious
as a periodic exchange rate adjustment will result in some inflation.43 However, to the
extent that this policy is supplemented by tight overall fiscal policy there should be no
concern regarding inflationary explosions. Second, the discrimination between short
term (speculative) capital and longer term capital should go a long way in helping
resolve the preoccupations regarding the effects of capital movements on real exchange
rates. To the extent that capital inflows are genuinely long term, and especially if they
help finance investment projects in the tradables sector, the change in the RER will be
a "true equilibrium" phenomenon, and should be recognized by such by implementing
the required adjustment resource allocation.
VI. Concludin2 Remarks
In this paper I have dealt with trade policy and growth. The analysis has
focused on the long run relationship between trade orientation and productivity
improvements, as well as on some of the most important transitional issues. With
regard to the latter, the analysis has focused on the recent Latin American experiences.
In Section II, I argued that more open economies will experience faster rates of
productivity growth than countries that distort their external sectors. A regression
analysis based on a broad cross country data set provided support for this view. The
analysis of the recent Latin reforms presented in Section IV also supports the38
hypothesis that those countries that have embarked in trade liberalizations programs
have experienced an acceleration in the rate of productivity growth. However, the data
on Mexico indicates that in order for productivity increases to be widespread it is
necessary to implement broad reforms and deregulation programs that affect a wide
range of sectors. In Section VI, I discuss the evolution of real exchange rates in the
region, and I point out that the recently observed generalized real appreciations have
become a cause of concern among policymakers. A key element in determining the
effects of these flows, and in designing policy response packages, refers to whether
these movements are temporary or permanent. If the latter it is difficult to justify an
activist stance in economic policy.39
ENDNOTES
1. Even thoughthe experiencesof the individual Latin countries varied during the
1950-80 period, in the majority of them some variant of inward-looking development
was the dominant policy. Since the early 1960s a number of trade liberalization
attempts took place in the region. Almost every one of them ended up in frustration.
In fact, until the late 1970-80s very little progress was made in this area.
2. However, as I argued in Edwards (1988) in many countries this increase in
protectionism was dictated by necessity.
3. There is a long literature documenting the consequences of protectionism in the
Latin American economies. For recent studies, see the Latin American cases covered
in the Michaely et al. (1991) project.
4. In the 1960s some countries decided to implement export promotion schemes based
on government support and adjustable exchange rates. To some extent this was
partially successful in Brazil. However, as Fishlow (1991) has pointed Out this
development did little to reduce Brazil's vulnerability to foreign shocks.
5. Krueger (1978) documents these developments for a large number of countries.
Diaz-Alejandro (1975, 1978) argued that real exchange overvaluation was one of the
most negative economic developments in Argentina. For an analysis of a large number
of Latin countries see Bianchi (1988). For an early discussion on the Chilean case, see
Behrman (1972). Since 1967 Colombia pursued a crawling peg exchange rate policy
explicitly aimed at avoiding overvaluation. The overall degree of protection, however,
remained high (Garcia-Garcia, 1991).40
6. Traditional neoclassical growth models concentrated on the effect of national
economic policies on the level of income per capita. The new generation of
endogenous growth models have shifted the attention to relationship between different
policies and the rate of growth of the economy. See Lucas (1988).
7. In Chapter 17 of his Principles of Political Economy (1848) Miii said that "a
country that produces for a larger market than its own can introduce a more extended
division of labor, can make greater use of machinery, and is more likely to make
inventions and improvements in the process of production". Arthur Lewis makes a
similar proposition in his 1955 classical book on economic growth. See Tybout (1992)
for a survey on the early empirical work in this area.
8. Grossman and Helpman (1992) provide a series of elegant models along these lines.
9. I assume that not all inventions generated in the world can be freely appropriated.
In that sense, A* could be interpreted as the accumulated stock of innovations in the
more advanced countries that have spilled over to the rest of the world.
10. This, of course, is the solution to differential equation (1).
11. Of course, in this case, (c+,-) >w.
12.In Grossman and Helpman's (1990) micro model of technological progress it is
also possible that, under some circumstances, more open economies will exhibit higher
long-run growth.
13. See, for example, Barro (1990).41
14. Naturally, these indices are at best proxies for TFP growth. Formally, we can
think that they measure TFP growth with error. To the extent that this measurement
error term is additive, it can be collapsed into disturbance iinequation (4).
15. These authors computed this index from a probit analysis on government change
using pooled data for 1948-81.
16. In simple OLS estimates heteroskedasticity was detected. Barro (1991) and
Edwards (1992), among others, also use weighted least squares in equations of this
type.
17. In equation (4.1) the standardized beta coefficient of TAXTRADE is -0.75; that of
GDP71 is -0.78.
18. The instruments themselves don't have to be measured free of error. Of course,
the use of instrumental variables is not the only way of dealing with measurement
error. In Edwards (1992) I use reversed regressions to construct intervals for a
different proxy of openness in standard growth equations for a group of 30 countries.
19. See Krueger (1978, 1981) and Michaely et al. (1991).
20. These are unweiehted averages, and thus are not comparable to those presented on
Table 5.1. There has been a long discussion in applied international trade theory on
whether tariffs and NTBs should be measured as weighted or unweighted averages.
Both views have some merits and some limitations. An obvious problem of the
weighted average approach (where the weights are the import shares) is that more
restrictive distortions will tend to have a very small weight. In the extreme case,
prohibitive tariffs that effectively ban the importation of a particular item will have a42
zero weight! Corden (196?) provides an early, and still highly relevant discussion on
these issues.
21. The issue of protecting local producers from "dumping" is an important one in the
design of the new liberalized trade regimes. The crucial problem is to enact legislation
that is able to distinguish true cases of unfair trade practices from simple cases of
increased foreign competition stemming from more efficient productive processes. At
this time the approval of a dynamic and flexible anti-dumping legislation should be
high in the region's agenda for legal and institutional reform.
22. See Valdes (1992).
23. This system with very low (or zero) tariffs on intermediate inputs and high tariffs
on final goods generated very high rates of effective protection or protection to
domestic value added. In recent years a number of authors have argued that the use of
effective protection is misleading. The reason for this is that ERPs are unable to
provide much information on the general equilibrium consequences of tariff changes
(Dint, 1986). In spite of this, ERP measures are still useful, since they provide an
indication on the degree of 'inefficiency" a country is wilLing to accept for a particular
sector.
24. However, "tariffs' is sometimes a misleading term, since many countries have
traditionally relied on both import duties (that is tariffs proper) and import duty
surcharges or paratariffs.
25. See Corbo et. al. (1985) for a detailed microeconomic account of the process of
adjustment in a large group of Chilean manufacturing firms.43
26. See Cox Edwards (1992).
27. The original TFP growth data comes from Martin's (1992) study on sources of
growth in Latin America. The countries in Table 6 are those that initiated the reform
before 1988. In order to compute series on total factor productivity (TFP)growth
Martin (1992) analyzed the contributions of capital and labor, and explicitly
incorporated the role of changes in the degree of capital utilization. The countries
considered in this study are: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Harberger (1992) presents data on TFP growth before
and after a series of historical trade reform episodes. He finds that in the majority of
the cases productivity growth increased after the liberalization process.
28. It may be argued, however, that the major increase in TFP growth in Chile has
been the result of the complete structural reform package implemented in that country.
29. Since these figures come from two different sources they may not be fully
comparable and, thus, should be interpreted with care.
30. Fuentes (1992).
31. Trade liberalization aims at increasing a country's total volume of trade. Under
textbook conditions it is expected that at the end of the reform trade will be balanced.
However, there are a number of circumstances, including the need to pay the country's
foreign debt, under which trade will not grow in a balanced way after a reform. This
has been the case in the majority of the Latin American countries.44
32. The real yj of exports, however, has evolved at a somewhat slower pace. The
reason for this is that terms of trade have experienced, in every subgroup of countries,
a significant deterioration during 1980-9 1 (see CEPAL 1992). These data are from
ECLAC (1991).
33. See, for example, Nogues and Gulati (1992).
34. A large percentage of this growth, however, has been in the maquiladora or in-
bond sector.
35. See Caivo, et al. (1992).
36. For a flavor of the discussion within the IMF see, for example, Burton and
Gillman (1991), Aghevli et al. (1991), Flood and Marion (1991) and Aghevli and
Montiel (1991). In Edwards (1992b) I deal with some of these issues.
37. The new impetus for fixed rates has strongly emerged in the International
Monetary Fund. See Aghevil et al. (1991).
38. This assumes that wages are set before the government implements the exchange
rate policy, but after it has been announced.
39. See Persson and Tabellini (1990).
40. Aghevli et al (1991).
41. See, for example, Edwards (1988).
42. An important peculiarity of the Colombian case is that the original inflow of
foreing exchange came through the trade account.
43. More specifically, with this option the one digit inflationary goal will be
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A. TFPGrowthComputations
One of the difficulties in computing TFP growth series for a large number of
countries is that capital stock series are rarely available. One way to deal with this
problem is to use data on investment-GDP ratios (Harberger 1992). The problem with
this approach, however, is that it requires data on the capital-output ratio. Although
these are not generally available, they can be obtained using alternative procedures.
TFP growth (p) is defined in the following way:
. S •
p = (y/y) — a(k/k)
—(1—a)(L/L) (Al)
where z is real GDP, k is the stock of capital, L is employment, and a is the
share of capital in GDP. Since (k/k) is equal to gross investment (I), equation
(A. I) can be rewritten as follows:
p= (/Y)-[a(y/k)(I/y) +(1-a)(L/L), (A.2)
(I/y) is the gross investment to GDP ratio, and is readily available. (y/k) on the
other hand is the inverse of the capital output ratio and has to be estimated.
In order to obtain data on p,inthis paper I have used the following procedure:
first, I used specific country time series data for 1950-88 to estimate GDP growth
equations with (lJy) and rate of growth of population (a proxy L/L) as regressors.
From these regressions I obtained estimated values for parameters [a(ylk)]and[1-a]
in equation (A.2). In the second stage, I used these coefficients to construct TFP data
using equation (A.2). In the third stage I averaged the estimated TFPs for 1971-82 foreach country. This average corresponds to variable TFP1 used in the regression
analysis in Section II.
A limitation of the procedure described above is that it assumes a constant
capital-output ratio (K/y) in computing [cx(ylk)]in(A.2). However, it is likely that
this ratio will change through time. In particular, we can assume that (y/k) =(yfk)0
+ time. In this case (A.2) can be rewritten as:
p= ('/y)-[c(yIk)(IJy)+ {cry](JIy) X time + (1-a)(L/L) (A.3)
This equation was estimated for each of the 54countriesto compute the TFP2 variable
in Section II.
Finally, TFP3 was constructed using cross-country estimates of [n(I/y)] in
equation (A.2). A shortcoming of this approach is that it assumes the same coefficient
across countries. In that regard, TFP3 can be considered as a less desirable measure

























































TOTAL TARIFF NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
PROTECTION (a) COVERAGE (b)
South America 51 60
Central America 66 100
Caribbean 17 23
North Africa 39 85
Other Africa 36 86
West Asia 5 11
Other Asia 25 21
(a) Includes tariffs and para-tariffs
(b) Measures as a percentage of import lines covered by non-tariff barriers. The data
on both tariffs and NIBs reported here are weighted averages




Eq. 4.1 Eq. 4.2 Eq. 4.3 Eq. 4.4 Eq. 4.5 Eq. 4.6
Definition of
TFPgrowth(a) TFP1 TFP1 TFP2 TFP2 TFP3 TFP3
Constant -0.013 -0.012 -0.018 -0.005 0.074 0.030
(-1.041)(-1.326) (1.418)(-0.439) (6.163) (1.772)
GDP71 -1.9E-06•7.3E-07-1.8E-06-1.1E-06-3.7E-06-1.5E-06
(.3433) (1.929)(.2.960) (2.451)(-3.673)(-2.187)
TRADETAX -0.076 - -0.074 - -0.199 -
(-3.033) (-2.620) (-4.902)
TRADE 0.017 - 0.025 - 0.025
DEPENDENCY (3.147) (3.910) (2.480)
GOVERNMENT -6.1E-04-4.2E-04-6.5E-04-4.1E-04-2.OE-03-2.OE-03
(-2.429)(-1.708)(-2.292)(-1.433)(-5.157)(-4.827)
EDUCATiON 1.19E-04 1.56E-07 5.90E-05 1.30E-04 - 1.20E-04
(1.536) (2.130) (0.675) (1.560) (0.895)
EDUCATION - - - - 1 .60E-04 -
(1.453)
POLmCAL -0.017 -0.017 .0.026 -0.043 -0.014 -0.023
INSTABILiTY (-2.117)(-2.480)(.2.846)(-5.253)(-1.607)(-1.802)
INFLATiON - 8.3E-05 - 8.8E-05 - -2.7E-05
TAX (0.540) (0.487) (0.921)
R2 0.400 0.351 0.492 0.487 0.598 0.416
N 54 52 54 52 52 52
(a) For exact explanations on how TFPI, TFP2, and TFP3 were constructed, see the Appendix.
* t-statistics in parenthesis. N is the number of observations; R2 is the coefficient of





















* t-statistics in parenthesis. N is the number of observations; R2 is the coefficient of
determination. The following instruments were used: a constant, GDP71 Governmen
Education, Trade Dependency, Imports/GDP ratio, Political Instability, and





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































REAL EXCHANGE RATES IN
SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
1985=100
COUNTRY 1970 1980 1987 1991
Argentina 78.7 35.8 80.7 44.0
Bolivia 98.3 88.1 107.9 112.1
Brazil 51.9 70.7 78.0 51.4
Chile 29.4 55.3 94.8 83.0
Colombia 86.1 79.2 115.9 126.3
Costa Rica 58.4 65.8 94.9 97.2
Ecuador 118.6 105.6 153.3 173.7
Mexico 86.1 83.3 123.9 77.0
Paraguay 104.6 74.4 111.4 114.3
Peru 59.3 77.1 46.1 23.1
Uruguay 73.0 49.7 77.2 62.0
Venezuela 80.3 84.2 134.8 132.8
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMFTABLE 6
CHANGESIN








For all countries but Chile, computed as the difference of TFP growth for 1987-91
and 1978-82. For Chile the pre-reform period is 1972-78.
Source: Martin (1992)TABLE 7
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITYGROWTH









Sources: The data for 1940-80 are from Elias (1992). The figure
for 1985-89 is from Ibarra (1992).TABLE 8
DISAGGREGATED PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH





Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 1.7 3.4
Textiles and Apparel 0.7 0.4
Wood Products 0.2 3.4
Paper and Printing 2.3 4.8
Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics 2.3 2.3
Non-metallic Products i.i 3.5
Metal Products 7.5 3.5
Machinery 4.4 4.7
Other Manufacturing -4.8 n.a.
Total Manufacturing 2.3 3.4
Source: ibarra (1992)TABLE 9
VALUE OF EXPORTS OF GOODS
AND NON-FACTOR SERVICES
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES
CONSTANT 1990 PRICES, US$
COUNTRY
1972-80 1982-87 1987-91
Argentina 7.1 2.6 10.3
Bolivia -1.8 0.6 11.4
Brazil 8.8 9.7 3.4
Chile 15.2 6.5 10.5
Colombia 4.9 10.2 6.6
Costa Rica 4.3 3.8 (*)9.1
Ecuador 6.7 3.3 9.2
Mexico 7.9 6.0 5.1
Paraguay 6.7 4.8 20.2
Peru 2.6 -3.7 0.9
Uruguay 10.0 4.2 7.1
Venezuela -7.3 3.6 5.6
(*) Changes over period 1981-87
Source: World Bank, ECLACTABLE 10
VOLUME OF EXPORTS
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES
COUNTRY 1972-80 1982-87 1987-91
Argentina 2.1 0.8 15.2
Bolivia -1.7 -5.2 16.5
Brazil 8.2 8.0 2.4
ChIle 7.4 7.6 7.5
Colombia 3.6 14.8 6.3
Costa Rica 3.8 6.2 (*)8.6
Ecuador 14.6 6.8 7.o
Mexico 10.2 6.1 5.2
Paraguay 7.3 9.2 27.1
Peru 2.3 -4.0 1.3
Uruguay 5.4 -0.5 8.1
Venezuela -5.8 2.1 8.3
(*) Changes over period 1981 -87
Source: World Bank, ECLACTABLE 11
COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS OF GOODS
NON-TRADmONALEXPORTS / TOTAL
COUNTRY 1980 1982 1985 1987 1990
Argentina 0.27 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.39
Bolivia 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.47
Brazil 0.57 0.59 0.66 0.69 0.70
Chile 0.38 0.22• 0.35 0.39 na
Colombia 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.55 0.64
Costa Rica 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.42 0.54
Ecuador 0.24 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.10
Mexico 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.38 0.43
Paraguay 0.58 0.71 0.82 0.68 0.65
Peru 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.29
Uruguay 0.61 0.58 0.66 0.67 0.63
Venezuela 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.19
Source: ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America, several issuesTABLE 12
COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS OF GOODS
EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES I TOTAL EXPORTS
COUNTRY 1970 1980 1982 1985 1987 1990
Argentina 0.14 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.31 0.29
Bolivia 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05
Brazil 0.15 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.50 0.52
Chile 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.10
Colombia 0.11 0.20 0.24 0.17 0.19 0.25
Costa Rica 0.19 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.24 na
Ecuador 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02
Mexico 0.33 0.11 0.10 0.21 0.38 0.43
Paraguay 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.10
Peru 0.01 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.17 na
Uruguay 0.15 0.38 0.32 0.35 0.55 0.50
Venezuela 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.15
Source: ECLAC. Statistical Yearbook for Latin America, several issuesTABLE 13
CAPITAL INFLOWS AND NET RESOURCE TRANSFERS
LATIN AMERICA 1981 -1 992
NET CAPITAL INTEREST AND NET RESOURCE
INFLOWS PROFIT INCOME TRANSFERS
1982-85 55.3 -111.7 -56.4
1986-89 33.5 -138.7 -105.2
1990 17.0 -35.7 -18.7
1991 36.3 -31.1 5.2
1992 (a) 42.8 -21.2 21.6
(a) Projection
Source: Jaspersen (1992)TABLE 14
NET CAPITAL INFLOWS AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP
IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
COUNTRY 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Argentina 2.4 0.5 3.0 2.9 1.8 2.63.90.21.0 6.3
Brazil 4.22.11.80.10.61.3 -0.50.41.30.2
Chile 4.4 2.3 8.35.0 3.03.73.7 4.37.82.5
Colombia 6.5 4.12.65.92.90.02.11.00.02.8
Mexico 5.6 -1.5 -0.6 -1.20.7 -0.7 -0.80.85.0 10.6
Peru 5.7 2.43.41.12.12.3 3.51.5 2.49.5
Venezuela -2.5 -6.6 -3.6 -1.8 -1.9 0.8 -1.5 -5.7 -4.14.9
Source: Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1DB, 1992.FIGURE 1
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